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in a nearly complete overthrow of 
the seedless vascular plants, which 
once dominated the planet. The 
modern‑day descendants of these 
giants, still dependent on water for 
half of their life cycle, are almost 
exclusively confined to swampy or 
tropical habitats. Equisetum, with 
their highly proliferative and resilient 
rhizomes, are more versatile than 
many species and can be found in 
various environments.
How do humans use Equisetum? 
In many cultures, the rough stems 
of horsetails are dried and used to 
scour and polish metal pots and pans, 
earning them the name ‘scouring 
rush’ in some parts of the world.  
In addition, traditional Japanese 
woodworkers use dried Equisetum as 
a type of extra‑fine sandpaper. Since 
Equisetum species can be found all 
over the globe (except Australasia), 
they have made their way into the 
traditional medicine practices of 
various cultures, dating back to 
ancient Greek and Roman times. 
The silica in the stems of horsetails 
is thought to aid in osteoporosis 
prevention, while extracts from 
horsetails are used for many different 
reasons, including as a diuretic, and 
as a source of natural antioxidants. 
Very few studies, though, have been 
performed to weigh the merit of 
these alternative medical uses for the 
plant. Interestingly, livestock have 
been known to become ill and even 
die after eating large quantities of 
Equisetum — for this reason, and 
because most commercial pesticides 
kill only seed‑bearing plants, 
horsetails are considered to be tricky 
pests in some areas.
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term ‘sense of agency’ refers to the 
experience of controlling one’s own 
actions, and, through them, events in 
the outside world. Most of us have the 
feeling that we are in control of what 
we are doing most of the time: this is 
the normal sense of agency. 
Why is it important? Some many 
mental illnesses involve abnormalities 
of agency: psychotic patients 
sometimes report that their actions 
are not their own, but are imposed 
on them by some other agent, while 
depressed patients often experience 
helplessness and loss of agency. 
Sense of agency also plays an 
important role in society generally, 
because it is central to the idea of 
responsibility for our own actions. In 
many countries, the law requires that a 
person be aware of the consequences 
of their actions, if they are to be found 
guilty of a crime.
How can sense of agency be studied 
scientifically? Despite its importance, 
sense of agency has proved difficult 
to study scientifically. Loss of agency, 
for example when one is driving a 
car that suddenly malfunctions, is a 
salient, and dramatic experience. But 
the normal flow of action and control 
forms a continuous, thin background 
to consciousness, rather than a 
specific, identifiable experience. 
Psychology and neuroscience 
have struggled to measure sense 
of agency. Most studies have used 
explicit agency attribution tasks, 
in which a person judges whether 
they did or did not cause a specific 
event. One experimental paradigm, 
for example, involves participants 
moving a joystick, while watching 
video feedback. They judge whether 
they caused the joystick movement 
shown on the video or not, equivalent 
to evaluating the truth or falsity of 
the proposition “I did that”. These 
studies have shown that spatial and 
temporal contiguity between one’s 
own and the observed movement 
are the major cues for self‑attributing 
agency; however, they say little about 
the phenomenology or experience of agency: that is, what it feels like to be 
in control of the image viewed on the 
screen, as opposed to out of control.
What brain computations underlie 
sense of agency? The experiments 
described above suggest the brain 
computes agency by predicting the 
consequences of current actions, 
and comparing these predictions 
to actual outcomes (Figure 1A). In 
the example above, knowing how 
one moves the joystick allows one 
to predict the visual feedback. If 
the video feedback matches the 
prediction, then it follows that “I did 
that”. If there is no match, then the 
visual feedback must have another 
cause. This account is based on the 
computations used to monitor and 
adjust motor commands in a popular 
computational framework for action 
control, leading to the suggestion 
that sense of agency is simply the 
normal operation of the goal‑directed 
action system (Farrer et al. 2008). In 
this framework, agency is computed 
by comparing a prospective signal 
(the intention or command to achieve 
the goal) and a retrospective signal 
(the actual feedback or outcome of 
action). An internal forward model 
uses a copy of the current motor 
command to predict the feedback 
that the action will produce. If the 
comparison between predicted and 
actual feedback generates no error, 
then “I did that”. 
Brain imaging studies of such 
tasks have not found any clear 
positive correlate of agency, 
but routinely show activation of 
the angular gyrus in the parietal 
cortex in situations of non‑agency. 
Angular gyrus activation increases 
proportionately as the subjective 
sense of agency decreases. This 
brain area may therefore either house 
the comparator, or receive the error 
signals transmitted by a comparator 
located somewhere else in the brain. 
These studies suggest a strong 
link between sense of agency and 
error‑monitoring in the motor control 
system, but they leave two important 
questions unanswered. First, why do 
we have a positive sense of agency, 
in addition to the negative sense 
of non‑agency that occurs when 
the outcome of an action is not as 
predicted? Second, what experience 
is there prior to receiving delayed 
feedback about action outcomes: 
could an experience similar to agency 
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Figure 1. The sense of agency.
(A) Computational motor control frameworks and sense of agency. To achieve a given intention 
or goal, an inverse model selects an appropriate motor command. The forward model predicts 
the outcome of the motor command, and this is compared to the actual outcome reported by 
sensory feedback. A comparator matches prospective signals (red arrows) and retrospective 
signals (blue arrow). Zero comparator error corresponds to a sense of agency. A second pro‑
spective signal generated during action selection directly contributes to the sense of agency 
(dashed red arrow). Easy and fluent selection of the appropriate action leads to stronger sense 
of agency. (B) Subliminal priming influences sense of agency over action outcomes. Partici‑
pants make left or right keypresses in response to target arrows. Brief subliminal arrow primes 
precede these targets, and can be either compatible or incompatible with the action indicated 
by the target. Keypress responses to the target elicit one of several colour patches, after a 
variable delay. Participants report more control over the colour patch on compatibly‑primed 
trials, compared to incompatibly primed trials. (C) A possible circuit for prospective agency. 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex selects between alternative possible actions. Conflict signals 
from this area are monitored by the angular gyrus, where they are interpreted as a reduced 
sense of control. Adapted from Chambon et al. (2012).be present at the time of the action 
itself, or even before it?
When does the brain compute 
the sense of agency? Most recent 
studies emphasise the retrospective 
component of agency for two reasons. 
First, the outcome of actions can be 
readily manipulated experimentally, 
but there are few methods for studying 
intentions. Second, psychological 
experiments have shown that we 
are often mistaken about our own 
intentions. For example, in an 
experiment where the outcomes 
of participants’ action choices 
were surreptitiously changed, 
participants reported having an 
intention corresponding to the actual 
outcome, rather than their original 
choice (Johansson et al. 2005). On 
one extreme view, sense of agency is 
really a retrospective confabulation to 
explain our own action choices, rather 
than a direct experiential consequence 
of neural processing in the brain’s 
motor systems. The predictions 
generated by forward models in 
the motor system may not reach 
conscious awareness.
There are, however, several 
reasons for thinking that sense 
of agency strongly depends on 
prospective processes, and is not just 
a retrospective confabulation. First, 
the brain prospectively represents the 
outcomes of actions before action 
occurs. Prior information about 
action outcomes increases sense of 
agency over those outcomes. When 
people are shown subliminal prime 
stimuli just prior to an action, primes 
corresponding to the consequences 
of the impending action lead to a 
stronger experience of control over 
the outcome than non‑corresponding 
primes. The primes in these 
experiments are not consciously 
perceived, but are assumed to boost 
the representation of the action 
outcome.
Could sense of agency be a 
metacognitive experience based on 
action selection? Recent studies have 
suggested that the brain processes 
that select between alternative actions 
may provide a second prospective 
agency signal, in addition to those 
generated by predicting action 
outcomes. Specifically, people feel a 
stronger sense of control when they 
choose fluently and easily what to 
do (Wenke et al. 2010). This finding suggests that the sense of agency 
depends on volitional processes that 
necessarily precede action, and so 
cannot be purely retrospective. In 
one study (Figure 1B), people were 
instructed whether to press a key 
with the left or right hand, or else 
freely chose which hand to press 
with. Subliminal arrow primes just 
before these instructions could 
either facilitate or interfere with these 
choices, by making action selection 
more or less fluent. Each action 
had the effect of making a colour 
appear on the screen. Importantly, 
different colour effects were used 
on trials where the primes were 
compatible with the instructed or 
freely‑chosen response, and on trials 
where the primes were incompatible. 
Importantly, the colour effects did not
depend on the primes themselves, 
but on the relation between prime and 
 
subsequent action. After several trials, 
participants rank‑ordered how much 
control they felt over the different 
colour effects they experienced. 
They reported stronger sense of 
agency over colours that followed 
compatibly‑primed actions rather 
than incompatibly‑primed actions, 
irrespective of whether they freely 
choose between actions, or were 
instructed which action to make.
How might action selection influence 
sense of agency? Most people 
recognise situations where they know 
exactly what to do, and fluently select 
the next appropriate action, like a 
well‑trained pilot in an emergency. 
These situations seem to produce a 
strong sense of agency, even before 
the outcome of action is known. 
Subliminal priming of actions may 
capture this situation experimentally. 
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Perhaps the most difficult biological 
question of all might be how and why 
electrochemical neuronal activity 
in the brain generates subjective 
conscious experience such as the 
redness of red or the painfulness of 
pain. Neuroscientists track how light 
impinging on the retina is transformed 
into electrical pulses (neuronal spikes), 
relayed through the visual thalamus 
to reach the visual cortex, and finally 
culminates in activity within speech‑
related areas causing us to say ‘red’. 
But how such experience as the 
redness of red emerges from the 
processing of sensory information is 
utterly mysterious. It is also unclear why 
these experiences possess phenomenal 
characteristics, which can be directly 
accessed only from the subject 
having the experience.  This is called 
the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness 
as coined by the philosopher David 
Chalmers. The phenomenal aspect 
of consciousness or ‘what it is like’ 
character of subjective experience 
is called ‘qualia’; the singular form of 
the word is ‘quale’, from the Latin for 
‘what sort’ or ‘what kind’. In this Primer, 
we provide an overview of the term 
‘qualia’ and its conceptual issues, and 
how neurobiological approaches can 
contribute to clarify some of these 
issues. 
The difficulty with qualia is their 
subjective nature: qualia exist only 
as viewed from the inside. They 
cannot be objectively detected or 
compared like any other properties 
measured in natural sciences. The 
subjectivity of qualia allows one to 
conceive hypothetical situations 
that philosophers discuss in thought 
experiments. For instance, we can 
assume, without any contradiction, a 
person with inverted qualia who, when 
seeing the colour red, has the quale 
that you would have when seeing 
the colour green, and conversely. 
In another thought experiment 
we can conceive a philosophical 
zombie who has all the cognitive 
and perceptual abilities like us but 
lacks any phenomenal experience. 
These thought experiments are often 
PrimerOur recent brain imaging study (Chambon et al. 2012) found evidence 
that the interaction between the 
angular gyrus of the parietal cortex, 
and the action selection centres in the 
prefrontal cortex, plays a key role in 
the prospective sense of agency. When 
incompatible primes interfered with 
the decision of which action to make, 
the angular gyrus activation at the time 
of action selection showed a negative 
correlation with sense of agency 
over action outcome. This negative 
correlation had been observed 
before, and was explained in terms 
of prediction‑outcome matching. In 
contrast, our study found that angular 
gyrus might compute non‑agency at 
the time of action selection, and not 
just retrospectively once outcomes 
were known. This study found no 
relation between angular gyrus 
activation and sense of control on 
compatibly‑primed trials, suggesting 
that this area monitors a signal related 
to difficulty and conflict during action 
selection, rather than the normal 
smooth flow of agency (Figure 1C). 
Moreover, the lateral prefrontal 
cortex, which is responsible for 
selecting between different possible 
actions, showed a negative correlation 
with the angular gyrus activation on 
incompatibly‑primed only, and no 
correlation on compatibly‑primed 
trials. These findings suggest a new 
model, in which sense of agency 
depends as much on how we choose 
what we do, as on actually doing 
it. The positive sense of agency, or 
feeling in control, could reflect the 
default state of the brain’s action 
selection networks, while the feeling 
of loss of control could reflect angular 
gyrus monitoring the conflict within 
frontal action selection mechanisms. 
On this view, the experience of agency 
would be a form of ‘metacognition’, or 
conscious experience corresponding 
to efficiency of action selection. In 
the computational framework above, 
the planner process, or inverse 
model, must contribute to the sense 
of agency, as well as the match 
between forward model prediction and 
outcome. 
Why do we have a conscious 
experience of agency? The 
prospective aspect of agency gives a 
clue as to why the brain might provide 
a distinctive conscious experience of 
being in control. Selecting between 
alternative action choices is often a difficult computational problem for 
the brain. An experience of sense 
of agency corresponding to fluent 
choice may be an important signal 
for guiding these computations. 
For example, we often make errors 
by pressing the wrong button on a 
machine, or by not knowing which 
button to press. The prospective 
sense of agency may be the brain’s 
way of generating the feeling of “just 
knowing the right button to press”. 
In contrast, prospective feelings of 
non‑agency may allow time to slow 
down, perhaps switching the brain to a
more attentive strategy of supervisory 
control. It is clearly useful to have 
such feelings prospectively, before 
pressing the wrong button, yet existing
comparator models can only explain 
the retrospective feeling of error after 
one has pressed the wrong button. 
The prospective sense of agency 
may serve as a marker when action 
processing needs to shift from routine 
to supervisory control.
We saw above that retrospective 
sense of agency can be tricked, and 
is sometimes illusory. The prospective 
sense of agency may also be an 
illusion. Simply having a feeling of 
fluently knowing which action to 
select does not guarantee the correct 
action outcome. For example, I may 
clearly feel that I know which button 
to press on the machine, but I may 
actually press the wrong button, or 
the machine may malfunction. The 
prospective sense of agency might 
only develop once the brain has 
learned a stable relation between 
actions and outcomes.
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